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BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNNERSITY OF
ALABAMA V. GARRETT AND THE EQUAL EDUCATION
OPPORTUNITY ACT: ANOTHER ACT BITES THE DUST

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett not only expanded state
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment but it also created
new implications for Congressional acts based on Fourteenth
Amendment rights. In its 5-4 holding in Garrett, the Court specifically overturned Congress's abrogation of state immunity
within the American with Disabilities Act, stating several in1
sufficiencies in Congress's reasoning. This decision could affect many private rights of action against states, not only under
the ADA, but also under other congressional acts based on sec2
tion five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This case note will focus on the Supreme Court's analysis in
Garrett and discuss this decision's implications for the Equal
Education Opportunity Act. More specifically, section two will
discuss the Equal Education Opportunity Act (EEOA). Section
three will outline the legislative and judicial history of the
Eleventh Amendment, including recent Supreme Court decisions leading up to Garrett. Section four will discuss the Supreme Courts analysis of Garrett. Section five will apply the
Garrett analysis to the EEOA. Section six will be the conclusion.

II.

THE EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY ACT

The Equal Education Opportunity Act is based on legal
principles found in the Bilingual Education Act of 1964 and the
1. Ed. of Trustees of the U. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §5 (Section five is the Enforcement Clause; it reads,
"The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."), see Erwin Chemerinsky, Forecasting the Future o{Federalism, 37
Trial18, 22 (2001).
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Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols. Congress passed
the Bilingual Education Ace in order to provide federal funds
to develop bilingual education programs. The act did not mandate that schools adopt bilingual education programs. The act
also provided extensive discretion as to how local authorities
4
ran these programs. In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court
held that the San Francisco school system's failure to provide
special language education to non-English speaking Chinese
5
students violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title
VI thus requires that school districts provide special language
education to non-English speaking students who would otherwise be excluded from public education because of their inabil6
ity to speak English.
Responding to the Lau decision, Congress passed the EEOA
in 1974. The EEOA provides that "no state shall deny equal
educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or
her race, color, sex, or national origin by ... the failure by an
educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students
7
in its instructional programs." By requiring schools to take
8
"appropriate action to overcome language barriers," the EEOA
9
does little more than codify the Lau decision.
A fundamental problem with the EEOA is that neither the
Lau decision nor the EEOA prescribe any particular education
program for schools to use. School districts still possess wide
discretion to create and operate bilingual education programs.
The various results of this wide discretion are the primary
source of litigation under the EEOA. Additional cases,
primarily Castaneda v. Pickard, provide state and local education authorities wide latitude to decide actions they will take to

:3. 20 U.S.C. §§ :3221-61 (1988) (Now found in20 U.S.C. §7401 (1994).).
4. See Nirej Sekhon, Birthright Rearliculated: The Politics of Bilingual Educa-

tion, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1407 (1999).
5. [,au v. Nichols, 411 U.S. 56:3 (1971); see also Scott Ellis Ferrin, Reasserting
/,anguage Rights of Native American Students in the Face of Proposition 227 and Other
Language-Based Referenda, 28 J.L. & Educ. 1, 9 (HJ99).
6. See Luis Rodriguez, Discretion. and Destruction, 4 Tex. Forum on Civ. Liberties & Civ. Rig-hts 189, 207 (1999).
7. 20 U.S.C. 9 110:1 (1971); Ronald D Wenkart, The Rattle Over Bilingual Education in CalifornicL, 123 Ed. L. f{ep. 4G!J, ;!()2 (1991>).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 170:1.
9. i{odrif.,'l.JeZ, supra n. fi, at 200.
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10
.
overcome l anguage b arners.
In Castaneda, rather than requiring that local officials take
specific action to address the needs of students who were English deficient, the U.S. Court of Appeals instead held that the
EEOA required only appropriate action. In other words, local
education officials are not required to offer any specific bilin11
gual education program. The court established a three-prong
test for determining the appropriateness of the language remediation:

First, the court must examine carefully the evidence the record contains concerning the soundness of the educational
theory or principles upon which the challenged program is
based .... The court's second inquiry would be whether the
programs and practices actually used by a school system are
reasonably calculated to implement effectively the educational theory adopted by the school. . . . Finally, . . . [i]f a
school's program, although premised on a legitimate educational theory and implemented through the use of adequate
techniques fails, after being employed for a period of time sufficient to give the plan a legitimate trial, to produce results
indicating that the language barriers confronting students are
actually being overcome, that program may, at that point, no
longer constitute
appropriate action as far as that school is
12
concerned.

The EEOA, initially thought ineffective, is now the law of
choice for bilingual education litigation. Bilingual education
litigation recently garnered national attention when California
11
passed Proposition 227. : Proposition 227 is a perfect example
of a state using the broad latitude granted to it by the EEOA to
create a program to deal with English-deficient students. California mandated intensive English instruction for Limited English Proficient (LEP) students. Proposition 227 also prohibited
any program designed to sustain a teaching program in alan14
guage other than English. The controversial issue of Proposition 227 was whether requiring LEP students to learn English
rather than allowing students to learn in their native language
10. Castaneda ex rel. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); see also
Keyes u. f:>ch. Dist. No.1, 57G 1<'. Supp. 150:l (D. Colo. 1983); see generally, Ferrin, supra
n. 5, at J l-12.
II. Wenkart, supra n. 7 at 4G3.
12. Castaneda, G48 1<'.2d at 1009-1010.
1:l. Rodrigum1, supra n. Gat 207; Wcnkart, supra n. 7 at 465, 468.
11\. Ferrin, supra n. 5, at 7.
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was in accordance with the EEOA. The EEOA '; .. looks only at
whether a program has the effect of excludmg NJ?P [NonEnglish Speakers] and LEP student~ fr?m_ the ed~catwn~1 program and does not require proof of d1scn~mator~ m~ent.
The EEOA's appropriate action reqmrement IS hkely broad
enough to include English as a second language_ (ESL) programs or structured immersion programs
much hke the pro16
grams being established in California. Given that proponents
of legislation such as Proposition 227 are now focusing on federal legislation, the issue of bilingual education will likely be
the source of continued litigation. As a result, the EEOA will be
17
at the forefront of the legal battles.
Congress specifically created a private right of action under
the EEOA. Section §1706 of the EEOA provides that "an individual denied an equal educational opportunity, as defined by
this subchapter may institute a civil action in an appropriate
district court of the United States against such parties, and for
18
such relief, as may be appropriate." Yet, the language of the
EEOA is void of any specific abrogation of state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. One possible reason that the
EEOA lacks a specific abrogation clause is that school districts
are not necessarily protected by sovereign immunity. Rather,
sovereign immunity is only granted to states and does not pro19
tect municipal corporations, counties, and school boards.
However, when a bilingual education proposal becomes a statewide law, like California's Proposition 227, state sovereign im20
munity will likely be a factor in any litigation under that law.
The EEOA is a prime candidate to be scrutinized under the

15. Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 Cal. L. Rev.
321, 331 (1987).
16. !d.
17. Ferrin, supra n. 5, at 7.
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (West 1999).
19. See Ronald D. Rottmda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law:
Substance and Procedure vol. l, §12.2, 156 (3d ed., West 1999).
20. See Ferrin, supra n. 5, at 11; John W. Borkowski, Alexander E. Dreier &
Maya R. Kobersy, The 2000-2001 Term of the United States Supreme Court and Its Impact on Public Schools, 156 Educ. L. Rep 381, 394. [n other words, if school districts or
school boards create their own language programs independently, then they will not be
protected by the Eleventh Amendment. If, however, a state law dictates how all schools
are to handle bilingual language programs, it stands to reason that suits brought
against the state based on this state law could call upon their Eleventh Amendment
Immunity. Moreover, state law may recognize districts as arms of the state government. As a result, a district would enjoy state sovereign immtmity.
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Garrett analysis because the EEOA not only creates a private
right of action for citizens but also implies that the action can
only be against a state.

III. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A.

The Eleventh Amendment's Historical Background

Congress and the states adopted the Eleventh Amendment
in response to the 1793 Supreme Court decision in Chislom v.
21
Georgia. Chislom was a suit brought by two South Carolinians working for a British creditor. The plaintiffs attempted to
recover bonds that the State of Georgia had confiscated. The
Supreme Court held that Georgia was liable to private actions
against it even though the State had not waived its sovereign
immunity. This holding prompted Congress and the states to
22
pass the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment
reads, "The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of an23
other State, or by citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
The amendment's authors only granted immunity to states
being sued by citizens of another state, demonstrating that the
24
amendment was written specifically for the facts in Chislom.
The Congress and state legislatures ratified the Eleventh
25
Amendment within five years with little debate. Because the
Eleventh Amendment passed so quickly, its legislative history
is relatively sparse, leaving the amendment open to interpreta26
tion and controversy. This lack of legislative history and
guidance lead to decisions like New Hampshire v. Louisiana, in
which the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
also bars private actions by citizens against their own state.
The Court in New Hampshire stated that the meaning of the
Amendment is not limited to the plain meaning of the actual
21. 2 U.S. ~ 19 (1793). See Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, J. M. Balkin & Akhil
Reed Amar, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 71-72 (~th ed., Aspen L. & Bus.
2000).

22. Brest, supra n. 21, at 72.
2:l. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
2~. Brest, supra n.21, at 72 n.3.
25. See l{otmula, su.pra n. 19, at 151.
2(). /d. at 152.
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text. Instead, the authors of the Amendment intended that
states should never be brought to court by private citizens
27
against their will.
Despite the Eleventh Amendment, states can still be sued
by private citizens in one of two ways. First, a state can consent
28
to be sued by a private party by waiving its immunity. Second, Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity under congressional powers found in the Constitution. The Rehnquist Court has recently limited the powers
Congress may rely on to abrogate state immunity to §5 of the
29
Fourteenth Amendment.

B.

Contemporary Eleventh Amendment Case Law

"In the past ten years, the Supreme Court of the United
States has begun a systematic reappraisal of doctrines concerning federalism, racial equality, and civil rights that, if success30
ful, will redraw the constitutional map as we know it." In
1990, Congress enjoyed seemingly limitless power to subject
the states to its social and economic policy under the combined
authority of the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Over the past decade the Supreme
Court has whittled away at Congress's longstanding power
over the states by renewing the states' authority and autonomy
and by restricting national authority over the states, culminating in the Garrett decision; the Supreme Court's latest blow to
31
federal authority over states.
As recently as 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
2
Transit Authorit/ , the Supreme Court rejected "as unsound in
27. N.H. v. La. 108 U.S. 76 (188:1); Brest, supra n. 21, at 72 n. 3.
28. Rottmda, supra n. 19, at 164.
29. ld, see Seminole Tribe v. Fla. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (The Court held that Congress cannot constitutionally use the Commerce Clause to create a private right of action against non-consenting states. One reason is that the Eleventh Amendment followed the Commerce Clause and, therefore, could not be altered by an earlier section.
Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment came after the Eleventh :'lnd can bind the Eleventh Amendment).
:10. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Reuo·
lution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1052-1053 (2001).

31. James Leonard, The Shadows ol Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism. May allect the Anti- Discrimination Mandate olthe Americans with Disabilities Act
52 Ala. L. Rev. 91, 92-93 (2000).
:32. 46~ U.S. 528 ( 1985) (Metropolitan Transit Authority brought action seeking
declaratory JUdgment that it was entitled to Tenth Amendment immtmity from minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Fair L3bor Standards Act. On appeal,
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principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity
from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of
whether a ,particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional'."~" Justice Blackmun's opinion was short-lived, however, as the Rehnquist Court would mark the beginning of its
constitutional revolution with the 1991 decision in Gregory v.
34
Ashcroft.·
Writing for majority in Gregory, Justice O'Connor rejected
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) as it applied to the Missouri State Constitution, which set mandatory
35
retirement ages for judges. By advocating the importance of
independent state sovereignty and by requiring Congress to
use unmistakably clear language when it intends to infringe on
a state's core functions, Justice O'Connor set the tone for the
36
Court's subsequent state's rights decisions.
The Supreme Court followed its decision in Gregory with
several key constitutional decisions that expanded the bounds
of state sovereignty. For example, the next year in New York v.
United States, the Court held that the Congress lacked the con37
stitutional power to command the states to legislate. Following New York, the Court in United States v. Lopez invalidated
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, thus limiting congres38
sional power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. Then,
in 1996, the Court decided Seminole Tribe v. Florida. In Seminole Tribe the Court invalidated Congress's direct abrogation of
Florida's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under the

the Supreme Court, ,Justice Blackmun, held that transit authority was not immune
from minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Act, essentially overruling National League o{Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).).
33. ld. at 546.
:34. 501 U.S. 452 (199]).
;{5. /d. at 473
;{6. ld. at 460.
:n. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, which, among other things, required New York to take title
of radioactive waste and assume the liability of the waste. New York ~ned, claiming the
act violated the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme
Court declared the Act unconstitutional in part, holding that the take title clause exceeded thf~ Tenth Amendment.).
38. 514 U.S. 549 (19!!5) (Lopez was convicted of violating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of H)!J() after carrying a concealed handgun to schooL On appeal, the court
held the Gtm-Free School Zones Act was beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause.).
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39

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Mter Seminole Tribe, Congress could not abrogate state immunity unless the act for
which Congress sought abrofoation derived its basis from §5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
All of these decisions led to the City of Beorne v. Flores deci41
sion and its progeny, the cases which most influenced Garrett.
In Flores, the Court further constrained Congress's power to
enact legislation under §5. The Court did this by restricting
Congress's power to pass acts only for the purpose of remedying
violations of constitutional rights as the Court interpreted
them. Flores gave the Court substantial reviewing power over
42
congressional acts that dealt with constitutional rights. Moreover, the remedy that Congress desired to enforce had to be
proportional and congruent to the scope and frequency of the
43
violations. Therefore, Congress was not only limited in its §5
powers to creating legislation that did not infringe on Eleventh
Amendment state immunity, but that legislation was also restricted by intense judicial scrutiny of its appropriateness to
. l atwn.
. 44
reme d y t h e vw

IV. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNNERSITY OF ALABAMA V.
GARRETT

The Garrett decision is important because, for the first
time, the court based its holding on the frailty of the legislative
materials alone, signaling a break from the Court's tradition of
45
deference to Congress as the fact finder.

;)9. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (The Seminole tribe sued the state of Florida and its governor, alleging that the State had refi.tsed to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of
gaming activities in a tribal-state compact, thereby violating Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The State moved to dismiss, citing its sovereign immtmity under the Eleventh
Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, holding
that the State did have immunity under the I<:leventh Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibited Congress from making states liable for private actions.).
40. William E. Thro, The Eleventh Amendment Revolution in the Lower Federal
Courts 25 .J.C. & U.L. 501, 503 (1999).
41. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
42. Balkin, supra n. 30, at 1054-55.
43. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
44. Balkin, supra n. ;~o, at 1055.
45. William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Shapiro, Lef{islative Record Review 54 Stan.
L. Rev. 87 (2001).
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Facts and Procedural History

In Garrett, the first respondent, Patricia Garrett, was a registered nurse employed by the University of Alabama in Birmingham hospital. In 1994, Garrett was diagnosed with breast
cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and
chemotherapy, which required her to take substantial time off
of work. When Garrett returned to work in 1995, Garrett's supervisor informed her that she would have to give up her position as a director. Garrett transferred to another lower paying
position.
The second respondent, Milton Ash, worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. Mter beginning his job, Ash informed the Department that he was suffering from chronic asthma and that his doctor recommended
that he avoid cigarette smoke and carbon dioxide. Ash asked
that his duties be modified to minimize his exposure to these
substances. Ash was later diagnosed with sleep apnea. On the
advice of his doctor, Ash asked the Department to further modify his duties to accommodate his new condition. Despite Ash's
requests, the Department refused to make any new changes to
accommodate Ash's needs. Ash then filed a claim with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Mter filing Ash
46
saw a drop in his performance evaluation scores.
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in district court
seeking money damages from the State of Alabama under the
ADA. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, citing
their Eleventh Amendment immunity. The district court
granted summary judgment for both cases. These cases were
consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, and the court of
appeals reversed the district court decision, holding that the
ADA validly abrogates the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity.47 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B.

The Garrett Court's Analysis

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five justice majority, reversed the circuit court by barring the respondent's action against the state under the Eleventh Amendment. Justice
Rehnquist cited four reasons for barring the plaintiffs' actions:

46. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362.
47. Td.
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(1) as long as the state's actions are rational, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require states to make special accommodations for the disabled; (2) Congress failed to identify a pattern of irrational state employment discrimination and, consequently, failed to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity; (3) Congress's §5 enforcement authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment can only be exercised for state transgressions, not for violations by local government units; and (4)
the ADA does not pass the congruence and proportionality
48
test.
Under the first reason, the Court admits that Congress can
abrogate state immunity if it does so pursuant to a proper exercise of its §5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment, but,
Congress's action must be limited to remedies for violations of
49
§1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court must determine whether the state had demon0
strated a pattern of irrational behavior towards the disabled. "
In this case, the Court found that the state's actions against
1
the disabled were rational.s For example, Justice Rehnquist
stated, "... it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources b¥ hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities ... _,s The majority found that the legislative record for the
ADA, though replete with many instances of discrimination,
lacked the necessary evidence to support a pattern of state dis53
criminatory actions against the disabled. In essence, the
Court stated that although the record contained some instances
of state discrimination, the states' actions were neither irrational nor common enough to establish a pattern, making the
states' duty to accommodate under the ADA greater that which
54
is constitutionally required.
Additionally, in response to the respondent's claim that the
48. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356.
19. !d. at 368.
50. !d.
51. !d. at 369.
52. ld at :l70 (,Justice Rehnquist states that although a single incident of discrimination by a state may be lmconstitutional, all of the incidents takPn together fall
short of suggesting a pattern of tmconstitutionality.).
53. ld. at 965; ("While cases since Hl!J5 had f(>cused on the evidence bef(Jre congress, in Garrett the Court for the first time based its ruling solely on the perceived inadequacy of complied legislative materials."). Buzbee, supra n. 4 7, at 87, 8!J.
54. Garrett, 531 lJ .S. at :J7o.
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Fourteenth Amendment not only governs states but also local
units of governments, the Court held that it would not extend
its inquiry to local units of government as the Eleventh
5
Amendment does not apply to them. " Again, the court used the
56
inadequacy of the legislative record to justify its holding.
In review, the cases leading up to Garrett restricted congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity to legislation enacted under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Garrett, the court went to the legislative record to determine
whether Congress was remedying a constitutional violation or
57
enacting legislation beyond the scope of its §5 power. If the
remedies were beyond the scope of substantive guarantees of
§1, then the remedy had to be proportionate and congruent to
58
specific documented violations of the constitution. The Court
found that the legislative record for the ADA lacked sufficient
specific instances to demonstrate that states were violating the
59
constitutional rights of disabled persons.
V.

A

THE EEOA AND THE GARRETT SCRUTINY

Specific Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Because the EEOA lacks language that specifically abrogates state immunity, the EEOA will likely fail to meet therequirements for congressional abrogation of state immunity outlined in Garrett. Since Seminole Tribe and Garrett, any
Congressional act that purports to abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity must contain an unequivocal expression
6
of Congress's intent to abrogate. ° For example, the ADA's abrogation section states, "A state shall not be immune under the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent juris-

55. !d. at :>66, n. 1.
5(). /d.
57. Cht,meri.nsky, supra n. 2, at 22.
5!3. Thro, supm n. 4 1, at 50:{-04.
59. Buzbee, supra. n. 47, at 118. In cases leading up to Garrett, the courts' rigorous scrutiny was f(Jcust~d on the lack of legislative findings. In Garrett, the legislative
record had ample evidence of discrimination, so the courts' scrutiny of the legislative
facts marks a sharp departure from the courts' precedents.
60. Diane !lt~ckman, Title IX Tapestry: Threshold and Procedural Issues, 153
Educ. L. Rep. 849, l-l5G (200 1).
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61
diction for a violation of this chapter." The reason for this
element is that congressional abrogation of state immunity is
an extraordinary event under current Supreme Court doctrine;
therefore, Congress must be clear and specific. The Court in
Garrett was satisfied with Congress's intent to abrogate state
immunity, so, alternatively, it took issue with whether Con62
gress had acted constitutionally under its §5 powers.
In contrast to the language of the ADA, §1706 of the EEOA
maintains that "an individual denied an equal educational opportunity, as defined by this subchapter may institute a civil
action in an appropriate district court of the United States
against such parties, and for such relief, as may be appropriate."6" The authorization for federal suits makes no mention of
suits against the state. The analysis of whether Congress articulated an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity is
64
objective, and does not rely on congressional intent. Therefore, without an express declaration of congressional intent, the
Court will not infer that Congress meant to abrogate state immunity.
Even if Congress had specifically abrogated the state's immunity, that abrogation must be a proper exercise of its §5
65
powers. Thus the Court must investigate the reasons Congress passed the EEOA. First, Congress must state that it is
66
acting under its §5 powers. The EEOA, in §1702 (b), states,
for the forgoing reasons, it is necessary and proper that the
Congress, pursuant to the powers granted to it by the
Constitution of the United States, specifY appropriate
remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of dual school
systems, except that the provision of this chapter are not
intended to modifY or diminish the authority of the courts of
the United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth
67
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Although the EEOA only makes reference to congressional
powers in the Constitution, it seems unlikely that the Court
would determine that the EEOA is based on anything but the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

42 U.S.C. §12202.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-64.
20 U.S.C.A § 1706.
Moore's Federal Practice§ 12:1.42 [l][b)[ii].
Garrett, 5:H U.S. at :{64.
Thro, supra n. 42, at 511-12.
20 U.S.C. § 1702(b).

313]

EEOA AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

325

Fourteenth Amendment. Under these circumstances the Court
will likely base its analysis on whether the statute goes beyond
68
the Fourteenth Amendment. The remedy mandated by the
EEOA is to "take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its in.
1
structwna
programs. ,69
One concern the Court will likely have with the EEOA is
that it does not re~uire proof of discriminatory intent to dem0
onstrate violations. If the remedies under the EEOA do not
require discriminatory intent, (the act itself is based on therestrictions of educational privileges based on race, sex, color, or
national origin), violations of the act without the intent to discriminate do not violate any equal protection Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The Court will therefore not likely find
that Congress can sustain the act as a valid exercise of its §5
powers if it is only trying to remedy poor education rather than
equal protection. Congressional attempts to go beyond the
scope of §5 will be subject to the 'proportionality and congru71
ence' test.
Furthermore, because the federal Constitution does not
guarantee any right to public education, any attempt to use a
due process rationale when making an argument under the
EEOA will be difficult. However, when states mandate public
education for all children, current law holds that that mandate
creates a property right for the citizens of that state. The Court
has held this interest in guaranteed education is a property in72
terest that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. That
being the case, depending on the state constitution, one could
argue that a state law that does not take 'appropriate action to
overcome language barriers' deprives students of property
without due process oflaw. However, because the Garrett court
also demonstrated an affinity for protecting the states' broad
discretionary power, even this argument may not be sufficient
to sustain the EEOC.

6H. Thro, supra n. 41 at 519.
6~J. 20 U .S.C. § 1703(1).
70. Momn, supra n. 15, at 331; see also .Tulie Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope of
School Finance and Resource Comparability Litigation, 36 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs.
L. Rev. 527, 550 (2001).
71. Thro, supra n. 42, at 50:1-04.
72. Ooss v. J.opez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
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Standard of Review

If the EEOA were to overcome the hurdles of sufficient congressional abrogation and constitutional validity, it would then
be subject to equal protection analysis. Equal protection analysis is a "three-tiered system of scrutiny by which the federal
courts examine classifications made by state actors in light of
73
the interests affected." This three-tiered system corresponds
with three types of groups affected by state classifications: sus.
pect groups, quasi-suspect
groups, an d non-suspec t groups. 74
Under an equal protection analysis the Court would not use a
rational-basis review, as it did in Garrett, because the EEOA
75
addresses constitutional violations of a suspect group.
Suspect groups are classified based on race, ethnicity, sex,
or a fundamental right such as free speech. When a state's action toward a suspect group is involved, the standard of review
that a defendant state must meet is the strict scrutiny test.
Under strict scrutiny review a defendant state must show that
it had a compelling interest to justify the actions in question,
and that its actions were narrowly tailored to its compelling interest.
Intermediate scrutiny, sometimes referred to as heightened
scrutiny, is used when the court is dealing with a quasi-suspect
class. For example, gender issues will trigger intermediate
scrutiny. This level of scrutiny requires the defendant state
show that its classification was substantially related to an im76
portant state interest.
In contrast, the Garrett court was dealing with a non77
suspect class. The Court uses a rational basis review when
dealing with a non-suspect class. Therefore, it applied a rational-basis standard, which places the burden on the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the challenged measure bears no rational
78
relationship to a legitimate state goal.
Because the EEOA protects suspect groups, the state must
demonstrate in an action under the EEOA that it had a com73. Leonard, supra n. 31, at 100.
74. !d.
75. See 20 ll.S.C. § 1701(1) (date needed) ("All children enrolled in public schools
are entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, st~X, or national origin.").
76. !d. at 100-0l.
77. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-67.
78. Leonard, supra n. 31, at 10!.
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pelling reason to make its classification. However, coupled with
the Court's strict scrutiny is the state's higher level of discretion under the EEOA. Although the defendant state must demonstrate a compelling reason for its action, the EEOA simultaneously gives the states wide latitude in choosing actions when
79
dealing with educational problems. Under the Garrett analysis, the court is likely to defer to the state's discretion even
though the state must simultaneously demonstrate a compel80
ling interest that supports its actions. Unlike Garrett, where
the court looked for patterns of sustained irrational state discrimination, the court under the EEOA will look for patterns of
state discrimination unsupported by compelling state interests.
This standard will affect how the court reviews the legislative
record.

C.

Legislative Record

The EEOA legislative record must affirmatively identify in81
stances of conduct by a state that violates the constitution.
The Garrett decision established that the Court will give Congress very little deference and will initiate a strict, skeptical
82
review of the legislative record. In section 1702 of the EEOA,
Congress explains its findings:
The congress finds that1) the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to schools solely on the basis of race,
color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment
2) for the purpose of abolishing dual school systems and
eliminating the vestiges thereof, many local educational
agencies have been required to reorganize their school systems, to reassign students, and to engage in the extensive
transportation of students;
3) the implementation of desegregation plans that require extensive student transportation has, in many cases,
required local educational agencies to expend large amount
of funds, thereby depleting their financial resources avail-

79. See Moran, supra n. 15, at :3:31.
80. Chemerinsky supra n. 2, at 18; see also Thro, supra, n. 42, at 501.
ill. Garrell, 5:!1 U.S. ai :l70.
82. Buzbee, supru n. 47, at 118.
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able for the maintenance or improvement of the quality of
educational facilities and instruction provided;
4) transportc.tion of students which creates serious risks
to their health and safety, disrupts the educational process
carried out with respect to such students, and impinges
significantly on their education opportunity, is excessive;
5) the risks and harms created by excessive transportation are particularly great for children enrolled in the first
six grades; and
6) the guidelines provided by the courts for fashioning
remedies to dismantle dual schools systems have been, as
the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "incomplete and imperfect," and have not established, a clear, rational, and uniform standard of determining the extent to
which a local educational agency is required to reassign and
transport its students in order to eliminate the vestiges of a
83
dual school system.
A private party bringing suit against a state for a bilingual
educational program will have immediate trouble under the
Garrett analysis because the codified legislative findings make
84
no mention of specific state violations. The Garrett court
pointed out that the "States alone employed some four and one
half million people. It is telling... that Congress assembled
only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimi85
nation in employment against the disabled." Garrett and its
predecessors require that the EEOA findings focus on continuous constitutional violations by state actors that the EEOA
86
would actually prevent. If the congressional findings supporting the EEOA fail to demonstrate instances of state actions
that violate the constitution, the EEOA is impermissible positive legislation, as opposed to permissible remedial legislation,
which does not constitute a valid abrogation of the state's sovereign immunity.
The Garrett Court specified that it would not consider instances of discrimination from municipal entities when considering the legislative record. Included in the municipal classifi87
cation are school boards and school districts. Because the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

20 U .:S.C. § 1702.
/d.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at ~370.
See Leonard, supra n. 31, at 13:i.
Rottmda, supra n. 19, at§ 12.2, 156.
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EEOA is based on discrimination in educational institutions,
the legislative record will likely cite many instances of classification with schools, school districts, and decisions by school
boards. As the Court in Garrett stated in regard to the ADA:
These [units oflocal government] are subject to private claims
for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to
rely on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so.
It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations
on their par, as well as by the States themselves, when on!¥
the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment.

In reality, without specific instances of constitutional discrimination beyond the schools and school districts, the court
will not likely hold that Congress had reason to enact the
89
EEOA against the states.
Moreover, the EEOA was enacted in 1974, long before the
recent revolution in constitutional law. Congress had no way of
foreseeing the strict scrutiny the Supreme Court would place
on the legislative record. Therefore, the legislative record will
not likely support the pattern of specific instances of discrimination by state actors, which the Rehnquist court now requires
90
before abrogating state immunity.

VI. CONCLUSION
Under the Garrett standard, the EEOA will fail to abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for the following reasons.
1) The EEOA does not specifically abrogate the states' sovereign immunity by making a clear, unequivocal statement
that it does so within the act itself. This problem could be easily remedied by a congressional amendment to the act indicating clear congressional intent to abrogate the state's right to
immunity. The ADA contains language that could appropriately be added to the EEOA: "A state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
88. Garrett, 531 U.S. at ;{69. One should note, however, that "school districts may
or may not be directly affected by Garrett depending upon their status tmder state law.
Districts that enjoy their states' l~leventh Amendmcmt immtmity, a question decided by
state law, would no longer be subject to damage claims under the ADA." Borkowski,
supra n. 20, at 3~>4 ..
89. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
~JO. Leonard, supra n. 31, at 130.
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States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent
91
jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter."
2) The remedies mandated by the EEOA do not apply to violations of the Fourteenth Amendment directly because they do
not require a discriminatory intent. If a cause of action is
brought under the EEOA that alleges a withholding of educational rights without discriminatory intent, the remedy is beyond the Section Five powers of Congress and will not likely
pass the congruency and proportionality test. A plaintiff can
argue, however, that his or her state right (dependent on state
law) to education is property that is being taken without due
process of law. Under that rationale, the EEOA could be used
to successfully bring an action against a state if the language
barriers do, in fact, prevent the student from receiving an appropriate education. However, given the Court's recent deference to the states' broad latitude to prescribe appropriate action to overcome language barriers, a due process claim will be
difficult to sustain.
3) The EEOA congressional findings will not sufficiently
demonstrate a continuing pattern of unconstitutional state action unattached to a compelling state purpose. Without a purpose for enacting the EEOA, the legislation becomes positive
legislation as opposed to a remedy, and is, therefore, an invalid
congressional exercise of power beyond its §5 powers. Part of
the problem is that the EEOA was "enacted mainly out of concern about the wide-spread use of busing as a remedy for past
segregation in the schools. Special [language] education programs ... were simply an example of the kind of quality education programs might be substituted for unpopular busing
92
remedies." Consequently, the chance that Congress gathered
the breadth of data that the Garrett court would require is
unlikely.
Because bilingual education is a battle that will continue
for years, eventually moving to the federal level, litigation under the EEOA will likely climb into the forefront of education
law. Whether or not Garrett was correctly decided, the Court
clearly indicated that the immediate future holds expanded
sovereign immunity for states and a higher level of scrutiny for
federal acts such as the EEOA. If litigated under the right cir-

91. ~2 U.S.C. §12202.
92. Moran, supra n. 15, at :J:i9.
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cumstances, plaintiffs may be unable to prove congressional intent to abrogating state immunity, leaving those plaintiffs
without a claim and Congress with another worthless act on its
hands.

Geoffrey Landward

